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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
CARL A. PALOMBI,

Plain tiff and
Respondent,

vs.

D & C BUILDERS,

Case No.
11284

Defendant and
Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This action was commenced by the plaintiff to
recover damages to his home caused by faulty '
workmanship growing out of a home improvement
contract for the installation of siding. The defendant
counterclaimed for the cost of labor and materials
on the contract which was in writing and for the
foreclosure of a mechanics lien.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The issues were found in favor of the plaintiff
on the plaintiff's complaint and the defendant was
denied relief on his counter-claim.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the order and
judgment of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the 23rd day of April, 1966, a contract in
writing was executed between the parties providing
for the installation of siding on the plaintiff's home,
for the sum of $3,290.00, payable $51.32 a month for
ninety six months. Work was commenced on or
about the 25th day of April, and on or about the
7th day of May, the work being a little more than
one third completed, the mother of the plaintiff hav·
frig become deceased, he requested a cessation of
the work for a few days, after he had procurred a
"stop work" order to be posted on his home the day
before, for lack of a building permit, and when the
defendant's manager obtained a building permit on
the 24th day of May the plaintiff refused to permit
the further prosecution of the work.
The defendant caused its lien to be recorded on
the 10th day of August, 1966, designating the 25th
of April as the date of the first and the 24th day of
May, the day of procuring the building permit as
the last.
The action of the plaintiff was started by the
service of summons on the 13th day of October, and
the. defendant filed a counter-claim for the collection
of its account or the foreclosure of the lien on the
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6th day of November. The plaintiff had paid nothing
on the contract as a down payment for labor, for
materials or for anything.
The court having tri.ed the case without a jury
found the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant and awarded judgment to the plaintiff
for $1 ,877 .DO and costs and ordered the removal of
the lien.
Paragraph 6 of the findings of fact holds as a
matter of fact that the lien of the defendant is in~
valid.
Paragraph 1 of the conclusions of law shows
that the judgment is divided into $627.00 as general
damages, $1 ,ODO.DO as punitive damages and $250.00
for attorneys fees.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE LIEN OF
THE DEFENDANT TO BE INVALID. -

The determinative question in Jhe court's , d~
termination of the validity of the lien was the ti:m&.
liness of its recordation. The court eliminated the
purchase of the building permit on the 24th day of
May, as a proper item to be included in the lien and
found that the lien was not recorded within 80 days
from the furnishing of the last material or doing the
last work on the job which was May 7th.
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The statute however, gives the general con
tractor 80 days from the completion of his contraci
38-1-7 U.C.A. 1953. Since the contract was not com
pleted, the question is therefore, a question of such
an abandonment as would constitute a completion
of the work.
The question is treated in 64 A.LR. 276, which
citation is given in the foot note of the statute:
"Abandonment of construction or contract as affecting time for filing liens. . . . There must be not
only a cessation of operation, but also an intent
on the part of the owner and contractor to cease operations permanently."

The reasoning fo the Totorica case, 16 Utah 2d
175, 397 P 2d, 984, at page 986, from an analogy of
the provisions of 38-1-11, would seem to allow 30
days from the date of abandonment for the commencement of the time:
"The mechanic's lien law was made for the benefit
of those who perform the labor and supply the materials. Rio Grande Lumber v. Darke 119 Utah 114,
16 P. 241."

and from page 987:
"We are therefore of the opinion that under the provision of Section 38-1-ll U.C.A. 1953, a lien claimant may bring an ::i.ction within 12 months after the
completion of his contract OJ.' if he wishes, bring it
within 12 months after there has been a suspension
of work for a period of 30 <lays."

It is not necessary, in this case, however to indulge this or any analogy, but only to determine the
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time of the abandonment, which was on the 24th
day of May, 1966, which would have brought the
recordation well within the 80 day period allowed
by the statute.
Mr. Nabor, the defendants manager was in Ogden. He had paid for and received the building permit. He visited the plaintiff at his home and there
learned for the first time that the plaintiff would not
permit the work to go on.
Here is the testimony of the plaintiff with reference to his conversation with the manager of the
defendant:
"Q

In other words you refused to let him do
the work?

A

Yes I would say so.

Q

For any price?

A

(Nodding head in the affirmative.)

Q

Is that so?

A

Yes." Tr. 22 line 1-6.

Here is what the plaintiff said with reference to
his conversation with Mr. Scott, one of the salesmen
for the defendant on the day of his Mothers death,
May 7th:
"Q

Did you have a conversation with anyone,
with reference to your mother's death,
could you tell us, of this company?
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A

Yes, I asked them for a few days to not io
bother around, until we could get things
organized ... Tr. 23-22.

A

He came up, he looked it over, and I told
him for two or three days to-well, that I
didn't want to be bothered with this here,
until I had Mom put away. So we could go
ahead with things." Tr. 24-5.

There was no abandonment either of the con·
struction or of the contract that would give rise to
the filing of liens until 1'.1ay 24th, 1966.
POINT II
THE DAMAGES FOUND AGAINST THE DEFEND·
ANT ARE UNFOUNDED AND ARE EXCESSIVE.

Paragraph 5 of the pre-trial order provides that
"there will be an issue of law as to whether the ...
element of punitive damages has been properly
pleaded by the plaintiff, and if so the amount of
damages sustained." There was no allegation of will·
ful misconduct or of malice on the part of the de·
fendant, and there was nothing in the evidence to
show either. It is the position of the defendant that
the finding of punitive damages of $1,000.00 or any
sum whatsoever in this case is error and should be
disallowed.
Further, there was no claim either in the com·
plaint or the plaintiff or in the pre-trial order for attorneys fees for the plaintiff or in the evidence, and
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it is the further position of the defendant that the

finding of attorneys fees for the plaintiff in the sum
of $250.00 or any amount is error and should also be
disallowed.
Notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff paid
nothing (Tr. 27-6) on the contract or for labor or materials which had cost the defendant out of pocket
cash in the sum of approximately $1,200.00, (tr. 13923) was prevented from performing the contract because of the acts of the plaintiff and that no evidence
of damage was introduced except the heresay evidence of two estimates which the court allowed over
the objection of the defendant (tr. 66-13), the court
gave general damages to the plaintiff for the sum
of $627.00. The defendant further maintains that this
is error and should be disallowed.
CONCLUSION
It is urged by the defendant that the findings of
the lower court be reversed and the case sent down
for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
HORACEJ.KNOWLTON
Attorney for the
Defendant-Appellant.

